Paul AMARA, Center for Sahel-Sahara Security Strategies (Centre4s.org)
In May 2025, more than 400 soldiers were killed in similar attacks targeting Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, all members of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES). The epicenter is the so called ‘’three borders area’’ a jihadists heaven for several years. Explanations abound: a sudden breakdown of the strategic partnership with western powers, a lack of coordination in the fight against terrorism, financial burden of this fight, operational difficulties and military exhaustion, more efficient terrorists’ organization, importance of multiple trafficking routes financing various groups, etc. To cope with, some countries may be forced to request assistance from regional or continental organizations.
The breakdown of military agreements between the AES and Chad with western powers had the immediate consequence of depriving them of satellite information on the movements of jihadist groups. Chad ended its military agreements with France in late November 2024. One of the official reasons was reportedly the French army’s refusal to provide Chad with satellite images of Boko Haram terrorists movements during attacks on Chadian soldiers in the Lake Chad Basin a month earlier. The area is home to fighters from Boko Haram jihadists and its splinter group, the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWAP). Other regions of the Sahel suffer from very difficult roads and poor infrastructure. Worse, terrorists are increasingly targeting telecommunications networks to avoid being reported to the authorities and also to block military communications. In Burkina Faso, according to the Postal and Electronic Communications Regulatory Authority (ARCEP), the number of communications towers destroyed by TAGs increased from 11 in 2019 to 106 in 2022. The number of out-of-service or inaccessible sites also increased, from 632 in 2022 to 681 in August 2023. This situation resulted in a 10 to 20% reduction in network coverage.
Russians to the rescue.
Following the breakdown of partnerships with Western powers, the AES called on the Russians, as well as on Turks and Chinese. However, in May 2025, Niamey terminated the intelligence component of the contract with Russia and Turkey. Niger deplores the operational weakness of the equipment and technicians provided by these two partners in the strategic field of telephone interception. The former American ally was then able to return to Niger. Indeed, after its coup d’état in July 2023, the junta had resoundingly denounced the defense agreements between the two countries in March 2024 and demanded the immediate departure of American soldiers present on its soil. This was implemented on September 17, 2024. On May 12, 2025, there was a spectacular turnaround: the country discreetly reconnected with the American military. Ambassador to Niger, Kathleen FitzGibbon, declared, « Niger remains a partner of the United States in regional stability and the fight against terrorism in West Africa. » The question: how will these former partners, who have patched things up, be able to work together again, in complete trust?
This reversal, however, comes amid trade tensions, still not yet resolved, between Niger and its powerful and discreet hydrocarbon partner, China. Burkina Faso has also had a rather curious start with its new strategic ally, Russia. Indeed, around a hundred Russian soldiers from a brigade called Bear, who arrived in late January 2024, were repatriated in early September 2024, officially to reinforce the front lines in Ukraine.
Coordination deficits.
Following the demise of the G5 Sahel on December 2, 2023, the Sahel countries have not yet rebuilt another structure for their common defense and security. Military cooperation at the regional level is virtually nonexistent. The Accra Security Initiative, adopted in 2017 by seven ECOWAS Heads of States and Governments could have taken over from the G5 Sahel and its Joint Force. But it seems to have stagnated since the creation of the AES. Burkina Faso and Niger accuse Benin of hosting French military bases intended to destabilize them. An accusation Benin strongly denies. On the other hand, Burkina Faso and Niger are in agreement with Togo and Ghana. The former occasionally accuses Côte d’Ivoire not only of sheltering its opponents but also of seeking to destabilize it. Both countries regularly denounce military incursions on either side of their porous respective borders. Diplomatic relations between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali remain cold, since the case of the 49 Ivorian soldiers arrested on July 10, 2022, then tried for « attempted conspiracy, » before being pardoned and expelled to their country on January 6, 2023. Mali also maintains strained relations with neighboring Algeria. On Wednesday, January 1, 2024, Mali denounced « Algeria’s proximity and complicity with terrorist groups, which destabilize Mali and to whom it has provided food and shelter. » Bamako denounced the Algiers Agreement on January 25, 2024, after noting the absolute inapplicability of the said Agreement, signed in 2015. It also points to Algeria’s « unfriendly acts » and interference in its internal affairs!
On April 6, 2025, Mali announced « firm measures » following Algeria’s « premeditated attack » on a Malian Armed Forces drone near their shared border in Tinzaouatène, on the night of March 31 to April 1, 2025. According to Bamako, the aircraft never left its territory and was shot down by Algerian missile fire. Algiers claimed responsibility for the drone’s destruction, attributing it to the violation of its airspace. It should be noted that one drone estimated cost is three billion CFA francs, or €4.5 million. Following this serious incident, the two countries decided to close their airspace to each other. Their land borders are also closed, causing an economic crisis in northern Mali, as this portion of the territory is supplied with various goods by its wealthy Algerian neighbor.
Difficulties also persist in relations between the giant Nigeria and its neighbor since the junta took over in Niamey. Niger periodically accuses Nigeria of harboring terrorists who regularly sabotage its oil pipeline to Benin. It puts Chad in the same category of hostile countries. Officially, Benin has requested, so far in vain, the reopening of its borders with Niger, closed since General Tiani’s coup d’état and security cooperation with Burkina Faso. The country recorded its deadliest attack on April 17, 2025, with 54 soldiers killed. Neighboring Togo has not been spared by terrorists. On October 8, 2024, an attack there caused the loss of eight civilians, and on October 19, 2024, another incursion left 19 dead.
Terrorists are paying the price.
Another phenomenon illustrates the serious difficulties facing the Sahel’s armies. Conflict Armament Research, a British NGO specializing in the traceability of conventional weapons, ammunitions and military equipment in conflict zones, published a detailed report on April 29, 2025, on the origin of the weapons used by the armed Groups active in the Sahel. It analyzed at least 700 weapons. It revealed that one-fifth of the seizures, between 2014 and 2023, came from the AES’s military stockpiles. Other weapons transited through countries such as Liberia, Libya, Nigeria, and Chad. One possible conclusion is that: « The more weapons these groups seize, the more outposts they attack and the more their capacity to continue these attacks increases exponentially. » Partly as a result of this, Burkina Faso increased its military spending by 108% between 2021 and 2024. Niger increased its spending by 56% between 2022 and 2024. As for Chad, its military budget increased by 43% in 2024. In Mali, it increased by 15.49%, from $785.30 million in 2023 to $929.30 million in 2024. At the same time, the TAGs are attacking the countries’ economic foundations. In Niger, they are sabotaging the 1,980 km pipeline, 675 of which is in Niger, intended to transport oil via Benin. In Mali, the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM), led by Iyad Ag Ghali, « protégé of Algiers, » according to Bamako, ordered his troops to attack the gold mines located in Kayes, Koulikoro and Sikasso. Order was given to them. They were also ordered to target companies involved in the construction, rehabilitation, and maintenance of strategic roads connecting Mali to the Atlantic corridors: Abidjan, Conakry, Dakar, and Nouakchott.
Facing such a tragedy, the need and urgency of a broader counterterrorism strategy should emerge. The Economic Community of West African States (ESA) foreign ministers and the President of the ECOWAS Commission held « consultations » in Bamako on May 22. Both parties recognized the importance of effective cooperation in the fight against terrorism. The supposed sponsor of the ESA, Russia, congratulated ECOWAS for its role in promoting the integration processes of member states, on the occasion of its fiftieth anniversary, at the end of May 2025. Morocco, already a signatory to various agreements with ESA member countries, demonstrating its ability to navigate delicate political situations with subtlety, has also offered to connect these countries to the Nigeria-Morocco Gas Pipeline, and then to accompany them until their return to ECOWAS. Finally, some diplomatic circles are raising the possibility of a Pan-African Conference, an adjective favored by the ESA, on Sahelian security, to be held in Addis Ababa with the co-presidency of ECOWAS, the African Union, and international partner States. A glimmer of hope?