Limam Nadawa, Consultant, Sahel Center for Security Strategies Sahara Centre 4s.org
Conflicts in the Sahel are entering into a major technological shift. In addition to ground combats, terrorists are increasingly using drones. That development is changing the balance of power on the ground. The armed terrorist groups (ATGs) weapons abilities, the appropriations they make from national armies stocks following combat, commercial logic and global geopolitics have all contributed to this phenomenon. Sahel armies, for whom these vectors were a panacea, are now rethinking their use. Therefore, with drones’ destructive impacts, the battle in the Sahel skies includes the fight in the electronic field.
In 2025, Africa main drone suppliers are: Turkey (32 sold), China (27), Israel (18); United States, 14; Iran, 9; United Arab Emirates, 7; France, 5; South Africa, 3. Customer countries are:
| Pays | Number de drones taken. |
| Nigeria | 18 |
| Algeria | 15 |
| Ethiopia | 12 |
| Morocco | 11 |
| Mali | 08 |
| Egypt | 07 |
| Soudan | 07 |
| Burkina Faso | 06 |
| Niger | 06 |
| Tunisia | 05 |
| Cameroun | 04 |
| Libye (LNA) Gouvernement de l’Est du Maréchal Haftar | 04 |
| Senegal | 04 |
| Libye (GNC) Gouvernement de Tripoli | 03 |
| Cote-d’Ivoire | 02 |
| Benin | 01 |
| Ghana | 01 |
| Mauritania | 01 |
| Soudan (Forces de Soutien Rapides, FSR) | 01 |
| Chad | 01 |
| Togo | 01 |
Sources : Africa-center.org FR Drones Sankey
Au Sahel, la guerre des drones entre djihadistes et juntes au pouvoir
YouTube, Le Monde, janvier 2025
Drones: Flagship Weapons.
The figures above show that many Sahel countries, or those affected by terrorism in the Sahel, are choosing drones as combat tools, despite their cost. The €30 million armed drone of Mali army, shot down on Tuesday, April 1, 2025, by Algeria army over its territory, was nearly at CFA 20 billion, according to Bamako. African countries are more consumers than producers of drones. Only one, South Africa, builds them. The major African countries are listed in this table:
– Nigeria, the third-largest army in the world in terms of troop’s number and the most populous country in Africa, with 237 million inhabitants;
– Algeria, the continent’s largest military budget, with US$25 billion in 2025;
– The Kingdom of Morocco, whose army ranks seventh in Africa and aspires to be comparable to those of world powers;
– Egypt, Africa’s largest armed force and one of the world’s top 15 military powers, according to Global Fire Power.com, which assesses the conventional capabilities of 138 militaries.
– Ethiopia, Africa’s fifth-largest military power, successfully halted the attempted secession of the Tigray province, partly thanks to Turkish drones.
– Sudan, Africa’s ninth-largest army.
– Libya, Africa’s tenth-largest army.
Within the AES, Mali leads with eight drones, followed by Burkina Faso and Niger, each with six. The enthusiasm is therefore real in all these countries. The problem is that the Armed Terrorist Groups (ATGs) also have drones, know how to use them, and can acquire or manufacture them in abundance, and at a lower cost, even if on a smaller scale. It should be noted, inter alia, that the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) of General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemeti, has also acquired drones. His opponent, General Al Bourhane, had received the Chinese ambassador to demand « explanations » regarding the fact that the RSF had acquired the same Chinese drones as his army. China refuted these accusations of collusion with the enemy.
In this regard, African countries turn to China for arms purchases because they are cheaper and also because agreements with China are not governed by international trade regulations. The largest Chinese arms manufacturer and seller, Norinco, opened an office in Senegal in August 2023. It already had others in Angola, Nigeria, and South Africa, and plans to open more in Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.
Militarized Civilian Drones.
The drones used by the ATFs in the Sahel are not necessarily military in nature. Most often, they are commercial models, available online or on parallel markets, from China or Turkey. Although they appear civilian, they, nevertheless, have become formidable tools for tracking, surveillance, and attack coordination. Easily accessible in West Africa, they are sold locally for multiple uses: agriculture, events, communication, etc. Due to their small size, they are easily concealed and can effortlessly be trafficked in a region where borders are porous, cross-border cooperation ineffective and corruption systemic.
In northern Burkina Faso and the « Tri-Border Zone, » these second-tier drones allow the ATFs to map army positions, observe their movements, and even guide ambushes with great precision. They are both economical and formidable tools of war, allowing destructive attacks to be carried out remotely without exposing their users to danger. They also represent an additional threat to civilian populations. « We can hear planes coming, but we can’t see drones, we can’t hear them, we don’t know where they’re coming from. They represent a constant threat. » People feel stressed when they organize events—weddings, baptisms, or funerals—that are sometimes targeted by attacks.
For propaganda purposes and to analyze their tactical performance, some TAGs film their operations using drones. Furthermore, cases of drones modified to carry explosive charges have been reported in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Benin, and Togo. Indeed, the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GISM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, is suspected of exploiting this technology to target military bases and self-defense groups. Between March and June 2025, the GISM focused its attacks on areas such as Boulikessi, Mali. The Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), in northern Mali, is operating in a similar manner. The two movements are cooperating in this regard, drawing inspiration from the conflicts in Libya and the Middle East.
To avoid detection, the GATs are equipping themselves with these fiber-optic devices to avoid radio jamming. This threat is being taken seriously by local authorities in Mali, where the governor of Kayes warned the population in July 2025 against the uncontrolled use of civilian drones. He described them as a potential risk in a tense security context. He instructed drone owners to restrict their usage and, henceforth, to consult the Defense and Security Forces before any launch. In Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) used suicide drones to attack Sudanese Armed Forces bases in Al-Qadarif, the capital of the eponymous state, located 350 km northeast of Khartoum, in April 2025. Explosions occurred, followed by ground-based missile strikes. Another major drawback is that drones increase the risk of harm to civilians. A report by Drone Wars UK, a UK-based website that researches the development and use of armed drones and other new lethal military technologies, reveals that from November 2021 to November 2024, approximately 943 civilians were killed by drone strikes in African countries.
Destroy malicious drones.
Drones remain relevant in the fight against terrorism in the Sahel, provided innovative solutions are used to destroy the malicious elements: laser weapons, jamming, kinetic destruction, and protective methods. These devices use a concentrated laser beam to destroy the drone in flight with surgical precision. They eliminate targets from a distance without spreading harmful debris. Laser weapons are particularly suitable for sensitive areas where rapid neutralization is required. This technology is recommended for protecting sites such as airports, nuclear power plants, and military bases. Jamming is a technique that disrupts communications between a drone and its operator, making navigation impossible. The method is recommended in densely populated areas to avoid collateral damage. It is also used to block malicious drones from accessing human targets and infrastructure. Kinetic destruction allows the drone to be brought down using projectiles. The downside is that falling debris can cause injuries to humans and animals as well as property damage. Armies also use drones detection systems, combining radar and radio frequency, to spot drones, including the smallest ones, within a radius.
A new challenge for Sahel countries: the skies are becoming militarized, with no concerted state oversight or comprehensive regulation of drone use. A legal framework needs to be developed, through participatory processes.