Paul AMARA, Consultant, Center for Strategies for Sahel-Sahara Security, Centre4s.org
The complexity and the earnestness of the fight against terrorism in the Sahel have transformed this region into a vast market for military training. Often occurring in the wake of arms sales, these transfers respond to the objectives and rationales of Sahelian armies and supplier countries, whether African states or international partners. Proposals come primarily from Russia, the United States, China, European countries, Iran, Turkey, and Morocco. One of the main challenges is aligning these achievements with the overall defense strategy of the concerned countries. Assessing their impact on the effectiveness of Sahelian armies is a major challenge!
While visiting Moscow in mid-November 2021, Foreign Minister, Abdoulaye Diop, stated that « at least 90% of the officers and military personnel were then trained here. » He added that Russian instructors—Wagner at the time—were helping Malians learn how to use the equipment, aircraft, and weapons received from Russia in asymmetric warfare. Mali needs the help of Russian technicians to maintain all of this military equipment. More specifically, the profiles sought by Afrika Corp—Wagner’s replacement—cover a wide range of functions, such as motorized infantry, artillery, armored vehicles, drone handling, electronic warfare and air defense specialists, military medicine, and translation into Arabic and French. Barkhane Legacy
Between February 18, 2013, and May 18, 2024, the Malian army received training in patrol operations. It also learned various techniques to counter jihadist offensives on motorcycles. Indeed, jihadist groups have the ability to quickly adapt to the various tactics deployed by Sahelian armies. Light reconnaissance and intervention units (ULRI), or Mobile Border Control Companies (CMCF) in Niger, were formed by the European Union Task Force Takuba. Malian soldiers also received support from Operation Barkhane, from August 2014 to November 2022. This entire package, as part of the EUTM (European Union Training Mission), aims to strengthen the autonomy of the Malian army, as well as EUCAP Sahel. Launched in January, this other capacity-building mission supported security sector reform, fostering effective management, transparency, and accountability of the armed forces. Along with Barkhane, the Sahelian armies formed a unique group of several thousand men who fought side by side.
Morocco on the front lines.
Since 2018, Morocco has hosted the annual African Senior Officers Conference, a strategic forum bringing together approximately one hundred senior officers from thirty African countries as well as the United States. This initiative is part of the AFRICOM (U.S. Africa Command) strategy. This mission seeks to support partner states in combating transnational threats, countering destabilizing external influences, and promoting resilient defense structures in Africa. Morocco also conducts extensive training activities in the Sahel countries. Thus, on August 18, 2025, a delegation from the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) made a working visit to the Directorate of Communications and Public Relations of the General Staff of the Mauritanian Armed Forces. The objective was to strengthen the partnership in the areas of military media and institutional communication. The fourth session of the Moroccan-Mauritanian Joint Commission, held in November 2023 in Nouakchott, was marked by discussions on joint training and education, embodying proactive and pragmatic defense diplomacy. This vision, in the eyes of the two neighbors, is in line with the new security realities of the Maghreb and the Sahel, where porous borders and illicit flows require a response not only be coordinated but also robust.
In July 2024, Morocco and Burkina Faso signed a military cooperation agreement, which includes, among other things, training and exercises, technical support, and military medicine. In this regard, Morocco hosted a delegation of Burkinabe officers in May 2025 for a military security training course. Also within that framework, 200 Burkinabe soldiers benefited from six weeks of theoretical and practical training in parachute jumping techniques at the Airborne Troops Training Center in Bobo-Dioulasso, between June and July In July 2024, Morocco and Burkina Faso signed a military cooperation agreement, which includes, among other things, training and exercises, technical support, and military medicine. As such, Morocco hosted a delegation of Burkinabe officers in May 2025 for a military security training course. Also within this framework, 200 Burkinabe soldiers received six weeks of theoretical and practical training in parachute jumping techniques at the Bobo-Dioulasso Airborne Troops Training Center between June and July 2025. Military cooperation between the Kingdom and Mali covers the same areas, with the addition of training Malian army units in the FAR military academies and schools. From May 27 to 29, 2025, a delegation from the Malian army visited Morocco as part of that agreement.
Flintlock, a major American exercise.
AFRICOM’s largest annual exercise is Flintlock, established in 2005. It is a combined military and police exercise. Its objective is to strengthen the capacity of key African partner countries to counter violent extremist organizations, collaborate across borders, and ensure the security of their populations. This American commitment is also reflected in a 46 billion CFA franc support program for units operating in areas most exposed to the terrorist threat. This same momentum will be complemented by another training program in combat first aid and essential medical skills. This year, Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, Chad, and Togo took part in the 2025 edition, which was hosted by Côte d’Ivoire from April 24 to May 14. A total of 38 countries, bringing together 500 Special Forces personnel, took part. Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana co-hosted the 2023 and 2024 editions. Flintlock 2024 trained 1,300 military personnel from some thirty African nations and their international partners. The fundamental objectives of the exercise are to strengthen interoperability, coordinate operations, and improve responsiveness to transnational threats such as terrorism and organized crime. The 2025 edition focuses on global security challenges, underscoring the importance of counterterrorism and joint action against regional instability. It promotes international partnership in the security context of West and North Africa.
China also has a significant presence in the field of military training in the Sahel. It has signed bilateral agreements with ESA countries for military training in China and the delivery of military equipment. In early 2025, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi unveiled an ambitious strategy aimed at strengthening security and stability on the continent. Its two key pillars:
– Training and capacity building for 6,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers to enable them to respond to ongoing security challenges, particularly terrorism and insurgencies;
– A commitment of $136 million in military assistance, to provide not only equipment but also technical expertise to modernize local armies.
Turkey’s « Drone Diplomacy. »
Turkey practices « drone diplomacy » with the Sahelian armies, using the argument of selling military equipment, particularly drones, to the countries of the Alliance of Sahel States (ESA). It also delivers surveillance and troop transport aircraft, along with instructors to train military personnel in the handling and maintenance of these delivery systems. Turkey has strengthened its strategic ties with Cameroon, a key country in the fight against jihadists in the Sahel. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler visited the country in early May 2015 during the third session of the Cameroon-Turkey Joint Commission. This was an opportunity to welcome the country’s numerous training initiatives. These include internships offered to Cameroonian officer and non-commissioned officer cadets at Turkish military academies, as well as hosting study missions from the International War College (ESIG) in Yaoundé and the International Security Forces Academy (EIFORCES) in Awae over the past two years. Many soldiers from the Sahel continue to be trained at these two major schools. Awae is a commune in central Cameroon, located 50 km from Yaoundé.
Until the end of September 2024, French soldiers, among others, were training their Chadian counterparts to serve as a vital link between ground troops and air forces. Their primary mission will later be to communicate with aircraft to facilitate understanding of ground maneuvers and ensure the distinction between allied and enemy troops. They will also be tasked with guiding reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft to detect targets of opportunity, allowing for real-time adaptation of maneuvers. The French Forces in Chad also organized modules for elements of the Chadian Air Force on escorting authorities, with an air component on MI-17 helicopters and another on land, at the Massaguet firing range, located 80 km north of the Chadian capital.
With this sample of training, how have the military capabilities of the Sahelian armies evolved in recent years? They have probably made progress. But to which operational level? Their jihadist enemies have also acquired new knowledge and more sophisticated weapons. For example, Russia and the ESA countries accuse Ukraine of having exported its war with Moscow to the Sahel, notably by supplying drones and relevant expertise to armed terrorist groups. Does this partly explain the difficulties Sahelian armies have in systematically countering the enemy in a constantly changing conflict context? Or just a new excuse for continued failures?