Paul Amara, Consultant, Strategy, Security, Sahel Sahara (Centre4s.org)
In the Sahel: should ransoms be paid to jihadists to free foreign hostages? This debate has been going on since at least 2003. Indeed, paying ransoms offers a chance of saving lives, but it also encourages, or even perpetuates, that practice. It is indeed an old debate. Refusing to loosen the purse strings is sometimes tantamount to signing the hostages’ death warrants. Given the complexity of the operation, sooner or later, countries end up using both methods, even if it means not revealing what really happened behind the scenes. Hostage trafficking remains a thriving business. Thanks to it, terrorist groups buy weapons, recruit new members and perpetuate the system.
On October 30, 2025, the United Arab Emirates reportedly paid the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (GSIM) nearly $50 million and the equivalent of another $20 million in weapons and ammunition to secure the release of hostages. These included a high-ranking reserve general residing in Mali. He was with two companions: a Pakistani and an Iranian. The three hostages were kidnapped on September 23, 2025, in Sanankoroba, Kati district, 40 km south of Bamako. The release agreement included that of 25 jihadists imprisoned in Mali, as well as facilitating their travel abroad. To save the face of the Malian authorities, GSIM reportedly pledged to release imprisoned dignitaries and military personnel.
The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), already struggling with difficulties, expressed concerns about the impact of redistributing this record ransom. Iyad Ag Ghali will have free rein to pay bounties to his fighters and other supporters. Part of the windfall will undoubtedly go to the Katibas deployed in forward positions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Nigeria. The money will trickle down to the Benin border, where the GSIM is fighting its rival, the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISGS). More spoils are expected. Indeed, on October 25, 2025, the same organization kidnapped two Egyptians, demanding $5.8 million for their release. It is also holding Chinese, Indian, and Bosnian nationals. The hefty ransom may have been the catalyst for another hostage-taking, which occurred eight days later, on November 7. The five victims, Indian expatriates, were kidnapped while traveling in Ségou, Mali. Negotiations for their release have so far failed.
Thus the industry of kidnapping-for-ransom remains thriving in the Sahel. According to a United Nations Security Council report, the sums paid for the release of hostages in the Sahel between 2015 and 2025 exceeded $400 million and directly fueled the resilience of jihadist networks. Hostages were executed after payment was refused. For example, Edwin Dyer, a British hostage, and a Swiss national were killed in December 2009 by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in northern Niger. The same occurred in 2010 when France refused to pay AQIM for the release of engineer Nicolas Germaneau. The debate between proponents and opponents of paying ransoms reached its peak in 2003. That year, a group of 14 European hostages were kidnapped in Algeria: nine Germans, four Swiss, and one Dutchman. Held for eight months, they were released after negotiations in northeastern Mali.
Paying ransoms allows negotiations to secure the release of fighters and individuals close to jihadists. Through these negotiations, it also amounts to their national and international recognition. Hostage-takers thus forge international connections. They acquire legitimacy as representatives of their movements and future national leaders, gaining the statesmen stature. And they gain greater media visibility, increasing their notoriety among potential jihadist recruits, rival groups and a segment of populations. In short, it’s a tool for publicity that facilitates recruitment. Social media exposes their actions and views, thereby encouraging extremism worldwide, including in the Sahel.
Countries that paid ransoms.
Officially, and up until 2012, several countries, including two African nations, agreed to pay ransoms to secure the release of their citizens: Germany, Austria, Canada, Spain, France, Great Britain, Italy, Madagascar, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Togo. The ransoms ranged from €2 million to a record €42 million.
Table 1: Official ransoms paid between 2003 and 2025
| Year | Country of origin | Hostages number | Paid ransoms (Mio Euros) |
| 2003 | Germany, Nederland, Sweden, Switzerland | 14 | 4,6 |
| 2008 | Austria | 02 | 02 |
| Canada | 02 | 03 | |
| 2009 | Switzerland, Germany, Great Britain | 04 | 3,5 |
| Spain | 03 | 08 | |
| 2010 | France, Madagascar, Togo | 07 | Between 20 and 42.000 |
| 2011 | Italy, Spain | 03 | 15 |
| France | 02 | Amount unknown | |
| 2012 | Switzerland | 01 | Amount unknown |
| 2025 | Unted Arab Emirates | 03 | 50 / 20 additional in arms and ammunitions |
Other hostages fate.
Hostages taken between 2012 – 2025 went through different fates (Tabe 2 below):
– assassination ;
– liberation, ‘’without condition’’;
– liberation, in exchange of prisoners;
– liberation, subsequent to combats;
– hostages evasion;
– unkown fate.
Table 2 : Other hostages fate.
| Year | Countries | Hostages numbers | Issue |
| 2013 | France | 02 | killed (two RFI journalists) |
| 2015 | Romania | 01 | Freed August 2023 |
| 2016 | Switzerlands | 01 | Killed September 2020 |
| USA | 01 | Freed 20 March 2023 | |
| Australia | 02 | One freed February and the second May 2023 | |
| France | 01 | Freed in exchange of
prisoners Oct 2020 |
|
| 2017 | Colombia | 01 | Freed 9 octobre 2021 |
| South Africa | 01 | Freed 16 December 2023 | |
| Geramany | 01 | Freed 10 December 2022 | |
| 2018 | India | 01 | unkown |
| South Africa | 01 | unkown | |
| Italie | 01 | Freed 8 october 2020 | |
| Canada and Italy | 02 | Run away after 450 days captivity
3 March 2020 |
|
| 2019 | Canada | 01 | Killed |
| France | 02 | Freed by french troupes after combats | |
| Italy | 01 | Freed 8 october 2020 | |
| 2020 | USA | 01 | Freed by US troupes in Nigeria,
31 octobre, after 4 jours captivity |
| 2021 | France | 01 | Freed 20 march 2021 |
| 2022 | Italy | 03 | Freed on 26/ 27 February 2024 |
| Germany | 01 | Freed 26 November 2023 | |
| 2025 | Austria | 01 | Unkown |
| Spain | 01 | Freed 20 January 2025 | |
| Marocco | 04 | Freed 4 August 2025 | |
| Suisse – Niger | 01 | unkown | |
| Inda | 05 | Unkown | |
| Iran | 01 | Unkown | |
| Inda | 03 | One hostage killed, 2 unkown fate | |
| Egyptians | 02 | 5,8 US dollars requested and negociations going on. |
The above figures also demonstrate that jihadists do favor taking hostages from developed western countries and India, Iran and Egypt are new comers.
Overall, ransom payments have fueled terrorism in the Sahel and sharpened the appetite of its leaders. That inclination has even led to the creation of a profession of « negotiators, » « mediators, » or « intermediaries. » In turn, these individuals also receive large sums of money in exchange for their « services. » They are generally Malian, Burkinabe, Mauritanian,Nigerian or Nigerien « tribal chiefs, » or influential figures within their respective communities. To inflate their bills, they add their burdens: « hard days driving in the desert, » « waiting for contact who will finally give a meeting, or even just another phone number, » « haggling over the ransom amount, » etc. That debate between supporters and opponents of ransom payments will continue for a long time in the Sahel.