Beyond  domestic problems, largely at the roots of their internal insecurity – political, economic and social including, again and again, slavery – the G 5 Sahel countries face enormous internal challenges presented in the attached paper . And there are many more.

Major challenges that fragilize the foundation of post-Cold War international relations. The crisis or rather the war in Ukraine, challenges us to think of our populations and our countries future. Not for post-Cold War ideological speculations but to put in place policies for the protection and the survival of populations and of even the countries themselves.

Instead of remaining passive spectators in front of televisions, we should do better in establishing technical teams to follow the multiple consequences in particular commercial of an international war which is lasting.

 Ahmedou Ould Abdallah

President Centre4s.org

Added to the diplomatic wrangles between Mali and the sub-regional organizations – UEMOA and ECOWAS – as well as between Mali and France, backed by the European Union – the war in Ukraine has overshadowed the Sahel security concerns. As a result – acknowledged by Niger President Mohamed Bazoum in an interview with French journalists on April 2 – “the G5 is in trouble”.

In a dynamic of appeasement, a strengthened and relaunched G5 Sahel Secretariat could reinforce the relationships between its member states. Such new momentum would help the G5 Sahel to undertake new cooperation with its international partners in the region.

The decision taken by Mali, in the 2021 last quarter, to bring in Russian Wagner paramilitaries is a source of multiple tensions between that country, its immediate neighbors of West Africa Economic Monetary Union and ECOWAS as well as with the international community. Bamako requested that Barkhane leaves the country as soon as possible and that Tabuka – the European Special Forces – moves its troops to Niger. Accusations of civilians’ massacres by the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) and their Russian allies prompted the European Union to stop the military training it had been providing to Malian armed forces. Between Mali and its neighboring Niger, oral incidents have multiplied, against a backdrop of accusations of interference made by the Malian side. Added to this situation came the military coup in Burkina Faso at the end of January 2022.

This heavy and thick diplomatic fog masks the Sahel security concerns. Attacks against the three countries most exposed to terrorism – Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger – have never ceased and have even experienced an increase since the beginning of this year.

Surge in attacks.

On Sunday March 20, 2022, eighteen Burkinabe soldiers died in two ambushes, in the eastern and southern regions. On March 14, seven civilians fell in the north, in Arbinda. In Niger, April 12, the Petelkole police station, Bankilaré department – Tillabéry region – was attacked and seven police officers killed. On that same day, a site of the National Guard of Niger, located in Djado, Agadez region, suffered an assault during which four elements fell.

Terrorists decided to also hit Burkina Faso in one of its main export resources: gold mining, whose revenues have gone from 974 billion FCFA in 2016 to 1,420 billion FCFA in 2019. On the night of March 31 to April 1, 2022, dozens of armed men on motorcycles attacked the gold panning site of Kougdiguin, near Barga, province of Namentenga , north of the country. Twenty-two deaths were recorded. Earlier, on March 12, eleven people had died in the attack on an artisanal gold mine in Baliata, near Dori, northern Burkina Faso. On March 9, the same macabre scenario has left 10 dead in a clandestine gold mine, Tondobi, town of Seytenga, near the border with Niger. As a consequence, on April 9 the Russian owner, Nordgold, announced, ‘’for security reasons”, the closure of the Société des Mines de Taparko (SOMITA). Its director specifies that the entire area around the operating sites is under terrorist threat, despite costly security investments. Alarmed by this situation, Burkina Chamber of Mines requested government authorities for special protection measures to prevent further closures.

Given, inter alia, these developments, the government has recently decided to launch a dialogue between young combatants and spiritual leaders in certain areas with a strong security deficit. Religious and traditional personalities will encourage young people who have joined terrorist groups to lay down their arms. The government has promised to support them in their social reintegration, particularly through professional activities. During a press conference on April 19, the Minister of State for Social Cohesion and National Reconciliation revealed that “these discussions” were already taking place, in the North and elsewhere. Thus, a number of concrete and urgent concerns that, to bounce back, the G5 Sahel Executive Secretariat could take up.

Two major assets for the G5 Sahel to explore.

Based in Nouakchott, Mauritania, this institution has two major assets: its new chief and indeed its host country. The G5 Sahel Executive Secretary is an experienced career diplomat. Yemdaogo Éric Tiaré was Burkina Faso Ambassador to France and later Permanent Representative to the United Nations, New York. Familiar with diplomatic activities, he has great abilities in terms of mediation and facilitation.

For its part, Mauritania is an asset to the G5 Sahel. Former Chief of Staff and former Minister of National Defense, President Mohamed Ould Ghazouani was already aware of the sub-region security challenges. A head of state that is well positioned to bring his peers together. He has demonstrated his calm in the face of the difficult relations between his country and Mali. On January 21, 2022, the Malian Armed Forces (FAMA) have been suspected of killing seven Mauritanian merchants on the border between the two countries. After having launched an investigation, the Mauritanian authorities reacted strongly, with the hope of putting an end to such acts. But on March 5, the FAMA, accompanied by elements of Wagner, did it again, with gunshots that injured two Mauritanians within Mali itself. In addition, Mauritanian authorities and public opinion are very concerned about the fate of fifteen compatriots, supposedly kidnapped by FAMA. Despite these serious incidents, Mauritania, which is not an ECOWAS member, has decided to open its port to Mali, under embargo from both the latter and the UEMOA. On the Transition and on the presence of Wagner in Mali, the country hardly made any unfortunate statements.

In tandem with the Executive Secretariat, Nouakchott is well placed to relaunch the G5 Sahel machine, with real chances of success. Indeed, a G5 Sahel failure would mean Mauritania diplomatic star waning.

The common way ahead, Roadmap, is all mapped out. It is about working to restore and maintain good relations between the organization five member states. In particular, it is wise to urgently reconcile two neighbors – Mali and Niger – whose misunderstandings have reached their peaks in recent months. Mali is also to be discouraged from claiming the rotating presidency of the G5 Sahel. Being under embargo, its diplomatic action for the Group is frozen. Then, it is recommended to provide wise advice to the Junta of the Patriotic Movement for Safeguarding and Restoration (MPSR) in power in Burkina Faso. Advice for it to avoid, after Mali, turning its back to both WAEMU and ECOWAS, especially on the duration of the Transition which should not be excessively long: three years!

Finally, the G5 Sahel will have to work hard to ensure that the quasi-general mobilization of donors and international institutions, in favor of Ukraine, would not excessively overshadow the worsening security problems of the sub-region. A diplomatic and communication offensive should be welcome, to remobilize the organization’s partners. Raising resources, for decisive actions in the fight against terrorism, would again be possible. A new rise of the G5 Sahel could also be equivalent to an upsurge of Mauritania diplomatic influence.

Backed by the host country, the G 5 Sahel Executive Secretariat could start the path of its rebirth by reminding member States and other international partners of their commitments vis-à-vis the G5 Sahel. By itself, that reminder shot would ring the bell for the remobilization…

By André Marie POUYA

centre4s.org,