Since 2012, the central Sahel region has been continuously subjected to multiple intimately linked political, security and humanitarian crises. Economic catastrophes were bound to follow and with them, famines and environmental degradation. In that already harsh context, the civil war in Sudan and its multiple consequences could only be harmful to the region. Revitalized at the level of its member states and supported by its external partners, the G 5 Sahel, as well as the institutions linked to it, may prove to be more useful than we think.

Sudan collapse.

Of all its past crises and civil wars, that of April 15, 2023 is undoubtedly the most dangerous for Sudan future. Bursting out no longer on its outskirts (Darfur, Kordofan, South Sudan) but in the center of its capital, Khartoum, this civil war, also called « the generals war », opposes the national army – Sudan Armed Forces or SAF of General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan and the Rapid Support Forces (FSR) of General Mohamed Hamdan Dogolo alias H’meyti. The confrontation of these armed forces threatens not only the future of the country but also that of several others in the region. It is one more civil war in an already battered region.

Numbers speak. Beyond the more than 2,000 dead already counted, the number of injured is around 5,100 and that of refugees and displaced persons is estimated at 1.9 million. In that context of shortages and mortal dangers, nearly 25 million of Sudan 45 million inhabitants are in need of humanitarian assistance.

Beyond these dramatic figures, a civil war is also an economic collapse on several levels. Past, current and future investments especially in agriculture, mining, gold in particular and tourism are at risk. This war is also a threat to the security of trade and maritime navigation in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal. The Gulf States – United Arab Emirates and Qatar – should be affected as is Saudi Arabia with its mega projects such as Neom.

Both humanitarian and economic, the Sudan war is first of all the political bankruptcy of a country that is to say of its ruling elites. After the fall of General Al Bashir in 2019, following popular demonstrations, the Army and the civilians of the “Forces of Freedom and Change” movement were unable to manage the Transition peacefully. The result is the country current collapse, conducive to even more political, economic and social disasters. Worse, the longer it lasts, the more an armed conflict becomes contagious. The flow of refugees and internally displaced persons and the struggles between the parties and their quest for external support, in arms and in funding, gradually transform the nature and the objectives of any internal conflict.

If not stopped rapidly, this gradual mutation of the conflict carries enormous risks for Sudan itself and its neighbors who will find themselves threatened. It stirs old enmities and antagonisms between leaders, tribes and regions. Its extension to the whole of Sudan is thus gradually taking shape. This evolution occurs by imitation effect when each group or region wants to either protect itself or to have a dissuasive means against a future enemy. It can also arise from the absence of a national leadership capable of deterring extremism and other centrifugal forces. Moreover, without necessarily wishing it, external sponsors, in support of one party or another, internationalizes a civil war. Then it becomes “a business”, difficult to stop because of many issues that are then more personal, financial and social than political. The initial causes of the conflict are gradually giving way to new ones leading to violence that favors extremism and foreign interference.

The entrenchment of the civil war and its various impacts on the country are preparing for the worst. The conflict, initially political and now armed with weapons, turns then gradually into a business war. Economic interests are carried out mainly for the benefit of national private groups and others. Therefore the conflict becomes much more difficult to resolve.

In the interests of Sudan, its neighboring states and friends, it is dangerous to ignore that the longer they last, the more internal conflicts get stronger. Rapid assistance to Sudan is therefore essential to the country survival and the stability of the region including in particular the Sahel states.

The turmoil continues.

Struggling with violent conflicts, particularly since 2012, some of the Sahel regions are currently experiencing enormous security, economic and diplomatic difficulties. Disarray linked and aggravated by the spectacular progress of drug trafficking in particular. According to the UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) report published in June 2023, this traffic has increased from 13 kg seized in 2013 to 35 kg in 2021 and 863 kg in 2022.

The largest seizures took place in Burkina Faso, i.e. 488 tons. Drug traffickers and other illegal operators – in cigarettes, migratory movements – find a « political whitewashing » of their activities in the support of rebellions and civil wars. They finance these wars to perpetuate them and thus to maintain their lucrative businesses.

The deterioration of its security situation and that on its borders – around Lake Chad, regions of the Gulfs of Benin and Guinea, also weakens the Sahel diplomatically. The war in Ukraine, mobilizing the attention and resources of the great powers, that of Sudan and its proximity to the Middle East and issues related to the waters of the Nile, essential to Egypt and Ethiopia, relativize the place of the Sahel in international diplomacy.

To prevent this international loss and encourage a return to stability, the Sahel ‘states and their neighbors should show more strength and quickly. In fact, the Minusma withdrawal, a request from Mali, will further destabilize that country. First of all, on security level, even in the long term, the Malian forces and their allies will not be able at the same time to both secure the ground left by the Minusma and to face the jihadists by simple deterrence. In addition, the Minusma, in its military and civilian components, is also a great financial contribution to the country’s economy – local jobs, rents, consumption and other services. In a state at war for a decade, a weakened economy aggravates popular discontent and fueling insecurity. So many factors that reinforce the presence of rebels and terrorists.

In this context of lasting, almost structural crisis, the states of the region and their external partners should undertake multiple preventive measures. The war in Sudan, the conflict in Libya, the continuation of armed violence around Lake Chad and the priority taken by the war in Ukraine invite the Sahel states and their friends to relaunch the G 5 Sahel. Its strengthening and expansion are priorities for the states and organizations concerned by terrorism in the region. A pivotal region situated between several continents (America, Asia, Europe) where fragile public institutions cannot cope with terrorism that is now almost part of the national political systems.

The old or newly announced production of gas and oil will not fail to sharpen the appetites of terrorists. Moreover, in the region, including in particular around the gulfs of Guinea and Benin, terrorism has been a reality for more than three years. In face of the real risks associated to the consolidation and expansion of violence, the appropriate response, as during the formation of the G 5 in 2012, calls for the strengthening of regional alliances in the fight against it. In this respect, the G 5 Sahel revival, despite current difficulties, remains one of the most effective contributions to the stability of the region. A strengthened and enlarged G 5 Sahel offers the advantage of starting from an institution that already exists. Beyond their antagonisms, external partners are mainly concerned by the anchoring of terrorism and the various trafficking linked to its presence in the region.

The UN Security Council announced on 29 June 2023 the Minusma withdrawal, effective in 6 months. Taking out 13.000 troupes out of a country in crisis may further weaken Mali and the region for the years to come. Many armed groups should be the main beneficiaries. Before becoming its victims, as were all those who launched ideological and political terror.

In fine, Sudan implosion should be avoided. That is for that country itself and also to prevent tragic contagion effects across the Sahel, weakened by the hasty Minusma withdrawal after that of French Barkhane.

 

Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, president centre4s.org