The anarchy that is developing in Mal, after the crisis that stroke with the military coup against President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) undermines the stability across Sahel Sahara. It also reopens the debate on the weight of Islamist groups and the impact of the fall of Colonel Gaddafi’s regime for the region.
Mali in Turmoil
We must go back up to the period 1963/65 to find the causes of the deep crisis in Northern Mali. This crisis is very complex in nature and peoples who are affected: Touareg, but also Arabs, Fulani and Songhai. Northern Mali is a vast and semi-desert region. It has always lived from various trades more or less legal. Tourism and the support of NGOs have long been its main resources. With terrorism, this windfall has dried up. Links with Libya, then, became the main source of funding, but also brought up weapons and ambitions.
Moreover, neighboring States are showing little coherence about the future of the Azawad, but do not seem to favor the independence of this entity. Finally, competition for the allocation of oil and gas blocks makes the Malian issue even more complicated to solve.
The crisis is a humanitarian disaster for civilians and, in particular, those of Northern areas. There is also little chance that it will stay confined to Mali alone. Especially since the threat of deployment of ECOWAS troops is sounding like a “rallying cry” or an “invitation” for extremists in countries, near and far away countries, to come to lend a hand to brothers already in the field.
Therefore, all ingredients are, present for the crisis to last, spread to the entire Sahel and to threaten externational interests. More importantly, competition among Islamist groups engaged in the field – AQIM, Ansar Eddin, Mujao, Boko Haram-, and between them and the MLNA, may actually conceal collusion. Is it a competition in the sense of Jihad, an internal effort of each organization in the overall regional Jihad, or a division of labor, or even a consolidation of each entity modus operandis in order to scramble tracks? The question arises, indeed, to the extent that, contrary to what usually happens among clandestine groups, none of these dissidents is accused of treason by his former colleagues in the Sahel.
In any event, the more Malian civilians and military fight for the control of power in Bamako, the more their opponents work to make irreversible the situation in the North, thus weakening further the whole region. To scare away local establishments, to promote politically and, therefore, socially their former « clients », to select and organize new recruits and to destroy the infrastructure, all these actions are part of a well-known strategy for sustainable control of the cities. The occupation or destruction of documents and historic sites follows the same logic. Anchoring violence and insecurity remains essential to the Jihadists; as well as the strengthening of the grey economy to facilitate financial revenue generation.
Northern Mali is already experiencing this structural change. The longer the crisis lasts, the more the new masters will make steps to secure their gains. This can range from attacks in neighboring countries by their supporters to perpetuating acts of violence in the Southern part of Mali. In such an unstable environment, where resentments concerning identity and economic interests are inextricably linked, the fall of Colonel Gaddafi has served as a trigger.
Libya Needs Stability
For the past several months, it has become fashionable to attribute the responsibility of insecurity and armed violence in the Sahel Sahara, not to its principal author, Colonel Gaddafi, but to the fall of his regime. Such an assertion is -at best- a sign of severe amnesia.
The instability of the region has an origin and a reality. The first one lies in various forms of trafficking, rampant criminalization of economies and widespread corruption. This is a source for delegitimizing many political regimes in the eyes of their people, and encourages rebellions and coups. The reality of this instability lies in the numerous Colonel Gaddafi’s interferences, often messy and contradictory, in internal and external affairs of the Sahel States for the past thirty years. By culture, or for other reasons, many African leaders have allowed the Colonel to fan the wind, their countries are now enduring the tempest. Some were so compliant as to visit Tripoli three times a year to pledge allegiance to the Guide.
From 1980 to his death, he was the greatest destabilizing actor of the Sahel. His immediate neighbors, Niger, Sudan and Chad and others, like Mali, Mauritania, Gambia and Senegal, have suffered from open warfare, subversions or interferences, he has funded. Thus, Tripoli served as the headquarters of an International of the Sahel rebel movements whose aim was to destabilize all the States whatever enemies or even friends of the Guide. Although the assistance provided to some countries was significant, it rarely compensated for the costs related to the fight against the outbreaks of rebellion ignited by Tripoli.
The international armed intervention, in support of the Libyan rebels, ended a bizarre regime. Less than forty eight hours after the first popular uprising in Benghazi, many top officials defected in large numbers. The movement swells in the following weeks and did not spare the security forces, the members of the government, or the diplomatic service. Contrary to the regime of Saddam Hussein that held up until the entry of U.S. forces in Baghdad before dispersing orderly.
The main criticism to be made for the international action in Libya is that it did not put enough energy to strengthen and broaden the base of the National Transitional Council (NTC). The same determination that brought an end to such a solitary regime should, even now, be implemented in order to consolidate the NTC. Its leaders must be encouraged to broaden their base, quickly put in place credible institutions and to stop ethnic and regionalist cleansing.
Instability in Libya is very contagious. From my own experience in conflict management, in almost all countries, people are inclined to live in a peaceful coexistence. It is their elites who fuel prejudice and mistrust, create fear, and raise citizens against others, thus creating the conditions for the outbreak of civil wars. Therefore, the grievances of the elites must be addressed to facilitate the establishment of conditions for reconciliation and stability.
Out of the Crisis
Specifically, personalities of the Gaddafi’s regime who are not under international pursuits, seek to establish a dialogue with their brothers of the NTC in Tripoli. They expressed this desire through various fora, especially in the Arab press in London. A relative of the Colonel, Ahmed Ghaddaf el-Dam, plays an active role in this group. Destabilized, Mali and the rest of the Sahel will never find peace without a Libya that is reconciled with itself and its neighbors. Indeed, this country should stop being the center of regional subversion. It also must agree to pay compensation to Sahelians who where expropriated or forced to leave their belongings in Libya. The fate of mix couples and their children deserves a special attention*.
With regard to Mali, the patriotic calls can be understood from a psychological and electoral point of view, but cannot lead to a lasting solution. The Malian authorities, ECOWAS and their neighbors most affected by the crisis, must be creative to avoid the entrenchment of the current situation. Of course, a massive military action, with all the logistical and financial resources may contain the rebellion, and, in the short term, control the current situation. However, these resources may take a longtime to mobilize. In addition, their effective disbursement will be ridden with conditionalities that risk crippling their effectiveness.
The rebels know all that. In the same way, they know that many soldiers in the region are more motivated by their monthly salary than the defense of the fatherland. While the rebels fight for a cause!
One solution to this crisis is to be found in a combination of strategies involving the consolidation of domestic political fronts, a sustained effort to meet the people’s demands for social justice and the fight against corruption. Regional cooperation among concerned States through collection of information as well as assessment of risks and, of course, a robust military action will also be needed.
For all these reasons, the warring parties have an incentive to negotiate without delay: the widespread unrest in the Northern part of Mali may fuel the emergence of new and powerful interests such as traffickers and organized crime. Otherwise, the problem could definitely gets out of the hands of the parties and their neighbors, to feed upon itself to last much longer.
Based in Nouakchott, the Centre’s area of intervention is the band of land stretching from Mauritania down to Guinea along the Atlantic coast and, across the savannah, to Chad and Sudan. The main issues it addresses are: defense and security of the Sahel Sahara; armed violence and terrorism; competition for oil, gas and uranium; irregular migrations within and outside the region; trafficking in human, cigarettes, drugs, etc; environmental and renewable energies. The main priority is to help the region and its international partners – public and private, as well as those from Civil Society organizations, Universities, Forums, and others Groups, to collaborate further in order to ensure security and prosperity of the Sahel