The Situation in Mali & Its Impact on The Sahel Sahara Briefing
by Ahmedou ould Abdallah, President of the Center 4s May 8, 2012
in Nouakchott, Mauritania
The Crisis in Mali
After twenty years of democratic practice–and a peaceful transfer of power, this crisis has all the ingredients to get worse, to last and to be contagious. Severe in the Northern part of Mali, it is explosive in Bamako with the risk of becoming a classic African civil war fuelled by a criminal economy through irregular exports of national products: cotton and gold, and trafficking in weapons and drugs.
The national army is deeply divided at all levels: senior officers, officers, NCOs and between Corps. The political class is also divided in anti and pro Junta. Finally, as they did earlier in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire, warlords will move to Mali to take actions promoting illegal trafficking and perpetuating the crisis.
Furthermore, the Junta faces the challenges of any new power: inexperience, arrogance, infighting, narrow base of support. Radical Islamists of AQIM, Ansar Dine, Mujao and Boko Haram, now ruling Northern Mali, and the other groups, particularly the MNLA and the FLNA, are competing in extremism. At the same time, the more the political power is fragile in Bamako, the more these two groups are squeezed out, and their moderate elements marginalized by the hardliners.
The Islamists will strengthen their overall presence which, however, involves risks of fragmentation. For now, the political vacuum and the uncertainty prevailing in Bamako help the Islamists to reinforce their ranks and unity, to ensure their expansion and the implementation of their agenda.
The call to dispatch foreign troops to Mali is a free advertisement for the Jihadists. It facilitates the recruitment, gives prestige to radicals and helps attract foreign fighters. If the ECOWAS troops are not coming there, it will be a sort of discredit to that organization. If they do come, there will be even harder problems for all to address.
In the North, the rebels have now at disposal three airports with international class- Gao, Tessalit and Timbuktu, able to accommodate larger aircrafts and transport all kinds of merchandises including drugs, weapons and, also, foreign militants.
The crisis in Mali is also a humanitarian tragedy with 320,000 people affected including more than 180,000 refugees in neighboring countries. This tragedy will expand as a result of the region precarious economic situation. For now, those refugees pose no security problems in host countries, but infiltration by extremists should not be ruled out.
Finally, the crisis has a security and existential dimensions in Mali, of course, but also in neighboring states. Will they remain –as they are now– in the borders they inherited from colonization? The effect of Sudan partition for the region, surely, is on many minds.
Which Impact on the Sub Region?
The Sahel Sahara is a rather consistent geopolitical ensemble. Thus, the longer the crisis, the more it will impact the whole region mainly in the following areas:
• By distracting governments’ attention and efforts from the national, political and economic priorities.
• By diversion of budgetary resources from economic development requirements in favor of the security sector demands for arms and recruitment.
• By discouraging or bringing even more cautious policies among national and, especially, foreign investors.
• By slowing down or even ending international development assistance since priority will be given to the humanitarian issues.
• By radicalizing religious groups and movements either by contagion or in a deliberate manner in order to protect their areas of influence from the competition of radicals. Countries such as Senegal, where the religious brotherhoods are powerful, could be affected.
• By bringing new tension and suspicion between Northern and Southern States in the Sahara.
Responses to the Crisis
Each crisis being unique, there is no single solution. Presently, two measures could help to overcome the crisis throughout the Sahel. Firstly, at the national level, some preventive policies through political inclusion and transparency in governance should be implemented. Secondly, there is a need for practical measures in order to contain the spread of the conflict and prevent it from taking deeper roots or infecting neighboring countries.
Among them, the authorities in Bamako should:
– confirm that the transition will last 40 days (or 12 months?), and who will lead it: the Speaker or the Junta leader;
– motivate and reunify the national army and security forces;
– reject the creation of ethnic militias;
– expand the government to include representatives of the North;
– avoid a competition between the winners and losers of the democratic revolution of March 1991.
– negotiate, while there is still time, with the forces in the North with the support of Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger;
– enlist the support of ECOWAS, the African Union, the United Nations, the US, France, and the European Union;
– limit the influence of drug networks on the current crisis.
As for the aftermath of the Libyan case:
– in order to stabilize Libya, and with it the whole region of the Sahel Sahara, the government in Tripoli should be encouraged to open up to supporters of Kaddafi not sought by international justice;
– to facilitate the return to Libya of the Sahel nationals who wish to work there and recover their property plundered or abandoned during the recent civil war;
– to organize and convene an international conference to address issues concerning relations between Libya and its neighbors especially those of the Sahel.
Conclusion
The longer the Malian crisis will last, the more :
– There will be divisions between the various power centers in Bamako. Actually, they may multiply and deepen:
– The radical Islamists will use this opportunity to strengthen their positions and attract local and foreign fighters.
– The crisis could be part of the international political landscape and become an ordinary issue as are the conflicts in Afghanistan or Somalia, for example.
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Based in Nouakchott, the Centre’s area of intervention is the band of land stretching from Mauritania down to Guinea along the Atlantic coast and, across the savannah, to Chad and Sudan. The main issues it addresses are: defense and security of the Sahel Sahara; armed violence and terrorism; competition for oil, gas and uranium; irregular migrations within and outside the region; trafficking in human, cigarettes, drugs, etc; environmental and renewable energies. The main priority is to help the region and its international partners – public and private, as well as those from Civil Society organizations, Universities, Forums, and others Groups, to collaborate further in order to ensure security and prosperity of the Sahel