Today, the greatest threat, and the worse difficult consequences to contain it, is not located in the Northern part of Mali, as one could legitimately think, but paradoxically, in the South and more specifically in Bamako.
It is no longer possible to minimize, even less ignore, the seriousness of the crisis in Mali on the country’s future. In the whole region of Sahel, the threat of destabilization is visible, serious and credible. While Mali is sinking inexorably into an unprecedented crisis, part of its political elite continues to behave as if nothing had happened. Riding on the ambient patriotism, they keep on hiding the (sad) truth to their fellow citizens, namely the ongoing disintegration of this old nation.
The tendency to blame the current national crisis on near or far away States will not resolve the present difficulties. For Malians, being civilians as well as military, the priority is to face the catastrophe that has befallen their country and seek to put an end to it by using the best card they still hold, negotiation.
Obviously, the strong presence in Northern Mali of several Islamist movements – AQIM and other armed organized groups- as well as the drug cartels and their pervasive networks, is most worrisome. They hold on three world class airports at Gao, Timbuktu and Tessalit where big airplanes can land, therefore transporting foreign combatants, weapons and other goods especially drugs. This is not a matter of reinsurance neither in Bamako nor in the other Sahel capitals. The more the rebels’ control over the North and the three airports continues to consolidate, the more their presence will deepen and the more costly it will be to dislodge them. In these circumstances, time is playing in their favor.
Power Struggle in Bamako
Otherwise, there is what might be called the paradox of Mali. Unlike other observers, at the Centre4s, we believe that the political situation in Bamako is more intricate and, therefore, potentially more dangerous to the integrity of the country than the one which is prevailing in the North. Today, the greatest threat, and the worse difficult consequences to contain it, is not located in the Northern part of Mali, as one could legitimately think, but paradoxically, in the South and more specifically in Bamako.
How can this paradox be explained? First of all, the context in which the official authorities operate in the capital is very unfavorable: a contested legality, a weakened or divided security apparatus, a Junta struggling for its survival, a mislead public opinion and finally, the loss of Northern provinces in favor of victorious rebels. Secondly, Bamako is diplomatically handicapped by the negative image related to the mismanagement of the military coup and its aftermath, including the physical aggression against the interim President, Dioncounda Traore. Moreover, the forces involved in that coup are not yet quite identified and their supporters remain in the shadows. Thirdly, despite the presence in the cabinet of experienced personalities such as Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra, the Transitional government is barely visible. As the Junta, it faces daunting difficulties.
In this already fragile environment, there are many challenges to face: a deficit in legitimacy, a military institution divided and traumatized and finally, a bleak economy. And, in addition, there are by now a larger number of Malians IDPs and refugees flocking to neighboring countries
Preserving the Integrity of the Malian Territory
Therefore, the stabilization of the North, as well as that of the whole country, requires primarily a functional State and a credible overall authority in Bamako. It requires, in particular, a government whose legitimacy and recognition are acceptable to the majority of Malians and also to their neighbors and partners. It will also require a well- restructured national army, reconciled with itself and with the population. The morale of that army must urgently be restored. All this calls for time and resources that are becoming very rare in these times of hardship. However, if their national economy and public finances continue to plummet, as this is the case now, it will take much more to reassure the Malian and safeguard the integrity of their landlocked country.
Proud of its glorious history, the Malian people should no longer accept to be fooled by those who tickle its pride while continuing to blame others for the disaster the country is going through unjustly. Specifically, a great people must be able to recover and overcome a difficult situation. With the loss of the Northern regions, a battle for the survival of the country and the regime itself is engaged in the worst political and economic conditions. A youth without hope of finding a decent job becomes more radical, traffic and trafficking continues while in Bamako the struggle for power rages and ethnic and social tensions remain explosive. Finally, West African warlords and their associates, orphans from crises since the end of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d’Ivoire civil wars, are preparing for lucrative new adventures in Mali. They will not let such opportunity go anytime soon.
Is Intervention the best solution in Mali?
In this very unstable environment, the deployment of international Peace keeping forces is being raised. It is suggested that these troops be dispatched in the framework of ECOWAS or even under a United Nations’ mandate. The aim of this mandate could be to protect Mali’s democratic institutions and help the restoration of its territorial integrity. But, for a number of reasons, legal and practical, this new perspective could complicate an already complex situation.
Indeed, there is a pre-condition before the Security Council can dispatch a Peacekeeping force to a country. A Peace agreement between the warring parties must be signed first. For the moment, this precondition is not met. Moreover, if a request to assist the Transitional Government and to protect the institutions may be agreed at the Security Council, safeguarding the territorial integrity and therefore an action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter can hardly get a green light in the current civil war context.
Furthermore, the mandate of a Peace keeping mission must be clearly defined as for its objectives as well as its duration. In the case of Mali, the purpose of this mandate remains to be determined. Are we talking of restoring democracy or returning – by force- the Northern regions to the central government in Bamako? Or even both at once? In any case, the duration and the cost of the mission will depend on the terms of its mandate.
Finally, the decision to mobilize troops poses a number of serious political, legal and financial problems. At the ECOWAS level, political and legal difficulties could be easily overcome, but not the financial matters especially when it comes to logistics. Transportation, equipment, weapons and other costs are essential to the efficiency and for the well being of the troops. The expertise within the United Nations system and the commitment of Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon to peace in Africa should help devise the most appropriate formula in the Malian context. However, the very nature of the mandate, to be approved by the Security Council, will determine the kind of funding this mission will need. It might be either “mandatory”, that is through the budget of the ONU, or “voluntary”, in other words through individual contributions of Member States willing politically, and able financially, to do so. At this stage, however, the budgeting of a Peacekeeping operation in Mali seems excluded.
The mission itself may be “hybrid” (UN and AU) as in Darfur or “specific” as AMISOM in Somalia with an appropriate financial arrangement. In the case of Mali, innovation could be to replace the AU by ECOWAS. In all cases, the legal problems at stake, the current financial constraints as well as the possible objection of a regional government, Algeria for example, do not encourage a quick decision by the Security Council.
The Role of a Regional Diplomatic Initiative
The restoration of Peace in Mali could be better served with a regional action, especially a diplomatic one. This could be conducted by ECOWAS and Mali neighbors and/or countries interested or concerned by its situation. The Centre 4S encourages this approach rather than an early involvement of the Security Council and a subsequent internationalization of the crisis. The corollary of that internationalization could be another one, but at the level of global terrorism. Not forgetting, of course, that drug traffickers, present in the region, are already operating on several continents.
Ultimately, to address the paradox of Mali, it is necessary, beyond acquired or lost territories, to also pay attention to the citizen and how to manage their cohabitation, starting by healing their oldest wounds. In reality, the nation is a project continuously under construction. Obviously this is true for Mali as well as for neighboring states if they want to be immune from a contagion that might otherwise become inevitable.
——————————————————————————————————————————————-
Based in Nouakchott, the Centre’s area of intervention is the band of land stretching from Mauritania down to Guinea along the Atlantic coast and, across the savannah, to Chad and Sudan. The main issues it addresses are: defense and security of the Sahel Sahara; armed violence and terrorism; competition for oil, gas and uranium; irregular migrations within and outside the region; trafficking in human, cigarettes, drugs, etc; environmental and renewable energies. The main priority is to help the region and its international partners – public and private, as well as those from Civil Society organizations, Universities, Forums, and others Groups, to collaborate further in order to ensure security and prosperity of the Sahel