Sahel: entrenched and still underrated conflict.

The announced visit on 20 December of president Macron to Bamako to meet Colonel Assimi Goita, Mali president, was an enormous surprise. Whatever the official reasons for its cancellation, it will no doubt mark a new cycle in the bilateral relations between Paris and the West Africa capitals. Issues that irritate Paris including the Wagner’s troupes are many and worse obsessive. There is no doubt that from the muddle surrounding Macron aborted visit, colonel Goita gets out as the winner. Undeniably, for the moment, he is reconfirmed even though the Sahel crisis, to the great frustration of its civilian population, is however far from being resolved.

Strangely, the longer it lasts and takes root and as its devastating damage multiplies, the more a conflict becomes used to. We now are there with the Sahel conflict, linked to terrorism and insecurity that, every day, are spreading geographically and taking deeper roots. Becoming rather a routine, the conflict forces everyone, near or far, to coexist with it and often on its own terms.

The dilemma posed by the crisis.

Then, this creeping crisis generates internal misunderstandings within states and discord between neighbors and with their allies, thus becoming an additional subject of national and international discord. Furthermore, any domestic conflict, in particular an ethnically or ideologically based rebellion, or both at the same time – as in the Sahel – the more it lasts and takes root, the more it sees its initial objective evolve or even change completely. Drawing on local populations’ psychology and practices, other goals and ambitions emerge that add to the rebellions initial demands. Therefore how to get peace or secure a strong substitute for victory? From experience, demagoguery and rushing forwards, highly prized in times of turmoil, are poor solutions. Informed pragmatism often pays more.

In this kind of long-lasting conflict, the main obstacle to a settlement, which is very often overlooked, is that for a variety of reasons, extremists are unwilling and probably unable to negotiate. Out of conviction or by dogmatism, they favor an all-or-nothing approach. This is true especially when they are well anchored in a vast region, such as the Sahel, and among populations more respectful and fearful of the traditional rules than the edicts issued by their distant rulers.

To these fluctuating contexts, should be added public opinion manipulation by the many and widespread social networks. The influence of these networks across the Sahel is seriously underestimated outside the continent. They impose the need, if not the obligation, for democratic governments, to initiate honorable crisis exit plans. A military engagement on the ground, affecting the resources, the image and essentially the notoriety of a country, or countries concerned, has an essential diplomatic dimension that it would be unwise to neglect.

Beyond savings human lives and diplomatic costs as well as budgetary constraints, the main objective of ending an armed conflict is to end it in a well-ordered and coordinated manner.

Today, even before being decided and started, this orderly exit is already in danger of being weighed down by the effects of the health crisis which continues to perpetuate itself across the world. The current impact of Covid 19 on international relations, including in the Sahel, remains to be assessed even if at present it does not favor the status quo. The populations no longer judge their governments on their sole actions in the political, economic and social fields but especially on the basis of the management of the consequences of the Covid19. This has called into question, or at least planted serious doubts about states’ ability to manage it well and at the same time to defeat terrorism, of which the Covid 19 has become an objective ally.

Based on inter states smooth relations, the multilateral system is under threat and with it, the international cooperation. Search for economic and diplomatic advantages is now closely tied to donation of masks, vaccines and other products or services linked to the pandemic. Thus, doesn’t the fight terrorism risk taking a back seat to emergencies and, with it, military cooperation budgets? That is the new dilemma in the Sahel where insecurity is lengthening and deepening its path.

 

Waiting is not a solution.

However, acting effectively is not easy. Like most countries in the world, the Sahel states find themselves in this economic context made more complex by the many direct and especially indirect effects of the pandemic: management of health systems – equipment and patients – more costly food imports and, sources of foreign exchange, exports are often jammed due in particular to the pressure on maritime transport. Known for its resilience, informal trade, a major pillar of several Sahel economies, is more scrambled than usual.

In addition to these health and economic consequences, the pandemic threatens Sahelian governments more fundamentally than others. Their populations, unaccustomed to the full exercise of freedoms of speech and free demonstrations, are de facto freer in the vacant space offered by Covid 19, far from administrative constraints. That may be an additional security threat…

In this situation, terrorists and their tribal supporters, operating in the illegal economy, find themselves there, ‘’like fish in water’’, and their progress is widespread even outside the Sahel. While governments see their operational capacities reduced, terrorists find in the crisis God’s hand opening up more space clear from the many police agents and other checkpoints to which so many people and many economic activities are victims.

NB In fine, criticism of the current international system of combating terrorism may appeal to a number of people as was the case at the Dakar 7th Forum They may be justified though an efficient solution, ensuring the security or stability of populations and countries, remains to be devised.

Indeed, the Sahel states and their allies should avoid the prolongation and trivialization of the conflict like those in Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen. They may seek to counterweight terrorist activities with strong actions involving the economy, markets and investments as well as national, ethnic or religious reconciliations. However, this development may be slow to stop the terrorist push and entrenchment that are spreading across the continent. Still, it could have the advantage of avoiding its perpetuation by returning the economic initiative to states and citizens.

In this overall context, France almost simultaneous announcement and cancellation of its president visit to Bamako, a signal of an interest, should be a comforting indication to Bamako authorities. To pro and anti-Wagner’ troupes deployment as well. Furthermore, the announced/cancelled visit should reinforce armed groups as they would see in it an encouragement to Bamako government to pursue its contacts with them. In that context, fueling furthermore the social networks, would the announced and cancelled visit further radicalize the situation or on the contrary help open new perspectives to ending the long lasting Mali crisis?

 

By Ahmedou Ould Abdallah,

President centre4s.org, former Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General in West Africa.