Limam NADAWA, Centre for Strategy for Security in the Sahel-Sahara, Centre4s.org

​In September 1989, when General Omar Hassan al-Bashir seized power, Sudan was the third-largest country in Africa—after Algeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo—with an area of 1,879,358 km². He steered his country down an “Islamist path” under the guidance of a Muslim Brotherhood leader, Hassan Al-Turabi. Finally, various conflicts eventually led to the secession of South Sudan in July 2011. Seven years later, protests demanding greater democracy and protesting the high cost of living triggered Al-Bashir’s overthrow by the military. An interim government was then established, led by Abdalla Hamdok, an economist and former senior United Nations official. However, military officers – fearing the loss of their privileges and dreading accountability for crimes committed during past conflicts -secured key positions within this government. They ended the transition by orchestrating another coup d’état in October 2021. Two officers came to dominate the power: General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and his deputy, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti. Their rivalry led to the current conflict. From that perspective, it is doubtful whether the civilian population – longing for a return to constitutional rule and suffering as victims of their bare atrocities – supports either side. Moreover, the United States has accused both camps of genocide.

​The Sudan war, that erupted on April 15, 2023, between the Sudanese Armed Forces – under by General Abdel Fattah Al – Burhan and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under his former deputy, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), is atrocious. By late 2025, it had already claimed 150.000 lives and displaced 12 million people. The conflict brutality conflict is also marked by genocide, sexual violence, and engineered famine. Faced with the impossibility of any truce, the question is whether this war is merely a result of a quarrel between two military leaders or of conflicting foreign interests turning it into a theater of mass slaughter formalizing the partition of the country or entrenched lasting civil warfare…like Afghanistan, Somalia and Yemen.

 Amid the nationwide struggle for food security, Sudan holds considerable strength. Of its total area – 2,505,810 km² (2014), it boasts the following agricultural potential (2007), by km²:

​Agricultural land: 1,367,730

​Arable land: 193,210

​Permanent meadows and grasslands: 1,172,270

​Forested areas: 663,677 (1)

​The country is a major producer of sorghum, millet, wheat, groundnuts, and sesame. It is also the world’s leading producer of Arabic gum and is well positioned in the production of high quality cotton. Below ground, the country is rich in gold, oil and other mineral resources: uranium, copper, iron ore, chromium, manganese, and zinc.

​It also possesses vast water resources: the Nile, one of the longest world rivers, flows across the country, irrigating its agriculture, supplying drinking water and serving as a navigable waterway. Dams and reservoirs, some generating hydroelectric power, are abundant. Such an environment strongly supports livestock farming. Sudan holds large herds of cattle and sheep. Renewable energy potential completes the picture: solar and wind energies find favorable conditions there. Moreover, it is a beautiful country whose tourism has been devastated by war.

The major players.

​China particularly supports oil production. In June 2026, the Sudanese government and China signed an agreement forgiving four matured, interest-free loans totaling $50 million [ii]. Russia also holds major interests there. The former Wagner Group, now operating as Africa Corps, has progressively become a major buyer of unprocessed Sudanese gold. Sudanese customs officials have identified Russian military transport flights loaded with gold. This smuggled gold is valued at approximately $2 billion [iii]. Due to sanctions imposed on Russia following the Russian – Ukrainian war, Moscow had to bypass the London market – the traditional exchange for gold trading and storage -turning instead to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, and China. An analysis of nearly a thousand shipments since the outbreak of the war tells that the UAE imported 75.7 tons of Russian gold worth $4.3 billion, compared to $1.3 billion in 2021. The war heavily benefits the gold industries of both the UAE and Russia [iv]. Sudan is seeking to leverage its geostrategic position with Russia, which could build a naval base capable of hosting four warships, including nuclear-powered vessels. Around 300 military personnel would manage the facility on a permanent basis[v]. « With its coastline on the Red Sea connecting the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, Sudan has the ability to influence global maritime traffic, security, and trade through its ports and naval bases, » notes a researcher from the Atlantic Council. This strategic corridor accommodates 10% to 12% of international maritime freight. Like Russia, the UAE and Turkey have sought to build naval bases there, though negotiations have stalled [vi].

The United Arab Emirates: Leaders in Gold

​Gold represents both the wealth meant to sustain Sudan and the threat financing its many fighters. The UAE is a major player in Sudan’s gold sector. The war has disrupted regional gold trade routes: bilateral gold trade between the two partners reportedly exceeded $1 billion in 2025 alone. A large portion of that gold – both legal and illicit -reportedly transits through the UAE, which has become a primary destination for precious metals originating from RSF controlled territories. Sudan Central Bank estimates that the UAE absorbed nearly 90% of official Sudanese gold exports during the first quarter of 2025 [vii]. In 2026, gold bullion worth over $100 million taken from Sudan Central Bank was reportedly tracked down to the UAE. According to the British newspaper Financial Times, the operation was facilitated through the complicity of the RSF and a state-owned refinery [viii].

Before the outbreak of the war, Emirati companies controlled thousands of hectares sown with oilseeds and fodder crops for export. Historically, the UAE has made substantial investments in these sectors. Prior to the 2019 coup, Saudi and Qatari entities had likewise made massive investments in Sudanese agriculture [ix]. Sudan and South Sudan combined held oil reserves of approximately 5 billion barrels in early 2024. In 2023, the two nations produced nearly 70,000 barrels per day (bpd) and 149,000 bpd of liquid hydrocarbons, respectively. They exported 125,000 bpd in 2023, nearly half of which went to the UAE [x].

Other Interested Actors

​The Sudanese Armed Forces, claiming sovereign legitimacy while the RSF challenges that approach, each rely on foreign backers who, publicly, deny their involvement due to the sensitive context. The army receives diverse support from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey, alongside China and Russia. On August 17, 2026, Khartoum and Riyadh signed an agreement establishing a Supreme Council for Strategic Cooperation and Coordination. For its part, the RSF is supported by the UAE. Many reports show that the UAE has fully backed General Hemedti [xi]. Early in the conflict between the two former allies, Al-Burhan’s government accused the UAE of supplying the RSF with weapons and mercenaries, by land and air, via Chad, Libya (its eastern region controlled by Field Marshal Haftar, closer to the UAE), Kenya, Ethiopia [xii], and Somalia. In particular, Ethiopia reportedly built a secret base 32 km from its border with Sudan, near the South Sudanese border, to train RSF fighters. This Emirati favoritism is documented by UN reports indicating that cargo planes originating from the UAE land in Darfur – an RSF stronghold – via Amdjaras Airport in eastern Chad [xiii].

​Under diverse pressures, Chad had to moderate its cooperation with the UAE regarding support to the RSF. Threats to Chad’s own military unity – divided on this issue – also played into the decision. Moreover, Sudan briefly threatened military retaliation against Chad through air strikes [xiv]. However, the UAE has reportedly drawn other nations into its strategy. Following a diplomatic cold between the UAE and Chad [xv] over the Sudanese conflict, the UAE turned to the Central African Republic to sign major agreements across multiple sectors. Abu Dhabi seeks to utilize Bangui – M’Poko International Airport, in the capital, and Birao Airport, in the east, for logistical operations backing the RSF. The UAE has also transferred British manufactured weaponry (of French origin) to the RSF, thus de facto implicating both powers in its regional policy. Despite Russia’s official stance, Africa Corps discreetly supplies sophisticated military hardware to RSF [xvi].

​In fine, major strategic interests pursued by powerful international actors severely complicate the Sudanese conflict settlement. Their financial weight and global political influence are so substantial that condemnations of foreign interferences in Sudan’s domestic affairs appear timid and thus with impact. Thus, will Sudan be the next Afghanistan, Somalia or Yemen whose conflicts are long lasting, structural?

 

​[i] Total area of Sudan | Agricultural land in Sudan | Arable land in Sudan

[ii] Published Sunday, June 28, 2026: Sudan: China cancels nearly $50 million in debt

[iii] By Olivier d’Auzon / 11.01.2024: For All the Gold in the Sahel – Le Diplomate

[iv] Published 25/05/2023 at 07:03: Exclusive – From Russia to Gold: The UAE Profits from Sanctions | Zonebourse

[v] By Nicolas Beau, December 3, 2025: Sudan: Russia’s First Naval Base in Africa – Mondafrique

[vi] Published November 21, 2023: Behind the War Tearing Sudan Apart for Over Two Years, Country’s Resources Sharpen Regional Alliances and Rivalries | Le Devoir

[vii] 06/08/2026 by Charly Hessoun: Sudan: Over $100 Million in Stolen Gold Transferred to the Emirates, Reveals Financial Times – La Nouvelle Tribune

[viii] 06/08/2026 by Charly Hessoun: Sudan: Over $100 Million in Stolen Gold Transferred to the Emirates, Reveals Financial Times – La Nouvelle Tribune

[ix] Published November 21, 2023: Behind the War Tearing Sudan Apart for Over Two Years, Country’s Resources Sharpen Regional Alliances and Rivalries | Le Devoir

[x] Energy in Sudan and South Sudan: A « Vital Role » for the Oil Sector

[xi] Notably Amnesty International, The Sentry, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime.

[xii] By the editorial staff of Mondafrique – February 12, 2026: Sudan: Ethiopia Trains RSF Near the Border – Mondafrique

[xiii] Ibid.

[xiv] Article by Saleh Mwanamilongo, DW 24/03/2025: Sudan Threatens to Attack Chadian Airports

[xv] newcentre4s.org https://newcentre4s.org › sahel-soudan-et-tchad-destabilisations-reciproques; see also: 01/07/2026: Sudan: Accusations of RSF Supplies via Libya

[xvi] Oscar Lafay, Published 30/06/2025: The Real Economic Stakes of the Sudanese Conflict – Portail de l’IE