Ahmedou Ould Abdallah, president centre4s

The Sahel tragic dilemma can be, more or less, summed up by this formula: no security without development. That is a dilemma as the reverse—no development without security—is also correct. Crises and conflicts that this region, the Sahel, has experienced since the great droughts of the 1970s and their human and economic consequences have completely transformed the landscape, particularly in terms of human and security circumstances. On that background, many perverse effects have been added or rather fixed on.

Regional insecurity.

Several of these effects are at the root of instability and continue to fuel it. The first is the rapid and intense urbanization, especially of states capitals. These cities are estimated to house between 28 and 30% of the total national population. Second, a high national population growth rate is often exceeding 2.7%. Added to this is a significant insecurity, certainly typical of societies in transition. Then there are very high levels of internal and interstates migrations. No doubts, external migration to northern countries—Europe, United States, and also the Arab Gulf States—remains the most noticeable news item.

Because of, or as a consequence of that volatile context, there has been a significant increase in exposure to external influences, both formal and informal, including a surge in various forms of trafficking, particularly in drugs, cigarettes and human beings.

These upheavals, which continue to intensify, pose many national, regional, and international security threats. Furthermore, the social media powerful development —widely used due to high rates of youth unemployment and/or underemployment, as well as the resurgence of tribal and community solidarities—further amplifies these threats. While remaining difficult to monitor and even more so to repress, these networks have become an integral part of Sahel society’s daily life. Insecurity in the Sahel is no longer solely a national issue. Over the past decade, it has gradually become a regional one. Carried out between neighboring countries, linked by populations sharing similar ethnic and cultural backgrounds, this conflict is fueled by government policies, often more tribal than national. Political and economic exclusion has gradually led to that retribalization of certain states. That destabilizing trend is confirmed year after year. In these conditions of an enduring and now structural insecurity, over the past decade, Sahel governments find themselves weakened by that omnipresent internal adversary.

In the Sahel often asymmetrical conflicts, « the strong loses by not winning, while the weak win by not losing. » As the American Charles Iklé postulates, « every war must end. » Still, in the Sahel, methods and means to achieve that objective remain to be found. States readily enter into war, ignoring or underestimating, the difficulties of extricating themselves from

it. The juntas of the Sahel believe, like the American General Douglas MacArthur in the 1950s, that « in war, there is no substitute for victory. » Realizing that entering a war is easy while exiting from it is very difficult, the same general reviewed his views: « The goal of war is victory, not its indefinite duration. »

In the concerned Sahel states, civil societies, like many external partners, wish an end to these conflicts that have been distressing the countries for decades. In that regard, it is worth recalling that Libyan 1970s and 80s armed interventions in neighboring Sahel states have severely weakened the entire region. Added to that, in the name of international jihad, was the influx of groups driven out of Afghanistan after September 11, 2001, and the armed attacks against the Malian government in 2012. These attacks led to the fall of a regime that had been relatively open to dialogue. That contagious instability then took root in the Sahel and continues spreading.

Fueled by the continued expansion of various highly lucrative trafficking networks – drugs, cigarettes, migration and illegal gold mining, that have destabilized permanently the Sahel states. A region that stretches 3,300 km east to west and 1,700 km from north to south. In these traditional societies, the impunity that followed conflicts and trafficking has generated immense material gains, strong political influence and also considerable social prestige for the rebellions often ‘’invisible leaders’’. A socio-political status that provides them with enormous financial profits while, simultaneously lubricating the terrorism expansion and entrenchment. Therefore their own political and financial capital. Their priority was to ensure that the messages are well conveyed, by putting them into practice, in order to perpetuate them on the ground through insecurity and personal financial gains. Still then, what future awaits these States and their populations?

Possible tracks to hope?

However convoluted and difficult, ways out, do exist. Undoubtedly, they involve more transparent national policies. Clearly, transparency faces enormous obstacles in times of conflicts and is often one source of illicit and rapid enrichment. The fight against corruption remains difficult without an independent and free press, police and judiciary systems. That fight is increasingly a demand loudly and clearly voiced by a public that is more informed and, thanks to social media, freer than its predecessors. Citizens connected to social networks and working more easily in anonymity and secrecy, than previous generations, are less intimidated or held back by the national leaders « late-night visitors. » A certain political era seems to be over.

In today’s Sahel, a better understanding of the modern economy demands is difficult to ignore. Economic growth and development form the foundation upon which responsible governments must shape to address the challenges posed by their public opinion. Security, peace and youth employment form, now, the basis of conflict prevention and national

cohesion policies. Their effective management is an essential ingredient for peace and, consequently, for the very survival of the regimes themselves.

In this regard, the international community—both bilaterally and internationally—should, despite its own current difficulties, support the Sahel countries that are making progress. That support is crucial to encourage imitation and curb the « verbal revolutions » that have ruined so many countries in the Region. Unlike principles in Singapore under Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysia with Mohamed Mahathir, two good examples for the Sahel: working hard and combatting corruption.

In fine, one point: Muslim countries, Algeria and Morocco, with populations of 48 and 38 million respectively, successfully rejected and fought against those eager to impose an ‘’imported politico economical system’’. Sudan succumbed to those pressures and losing its wealthy South Sudan in 2010, and is embroiled in a civil war since April 2023 that has further divided the country. Mauritania, 5 Mio ha should be cautious.